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With the rise of the BRICS there has been much talk of a
new paradigm for development. With new knowledge, exper-
tise, and investment, countries such as China and Brazil could
generate a new dynamic of development, particularly in
Africa, it is argued (Gu & Carty, 2014; White, 2013). The
rhetoric of ‘‘South–South cooperation” and ‘‘mutual learning”
has ﬂowed freely. Solidarities and connections based on
shared geographies, histories, and links forged through strug-
gles against colonialism and slavery have been added to the
mix. Others, by contrast, have argued that these new conﬁgu-
rations of power and capital are simply a new form of ‘‘neo-
imperialism”, replicating past patterns of extraction and
exploitation in new guises (Bond & Garcia, 2015;
Lumumba-Kasongo, 2011). Of course the reality is far more
complex than these simpliﬁed characterizations (cf. Alden,
2007; Brautigam, 2009; Carmody, 2013; Power, Mohan, &
Tan-Mullins, 2012; Taylor, Kopinski, & Polus, 2014; Taylor
& Xiao, 2009). Getting behind the claims and digging into
the details shows a more nuanced picture.
This Special Section therefore explores the emerging rela-
tionships between China and Brazil and Africa around a key
productive sector, agriculture. Through detailed case studies
and in-depth empirical investigations on the ground—in four
countries in Africa, as well as China and Brazil—the papers
together point to some important new features of development
cooperation, associated with BRICS countries (cf. Mawdsley,
2012a; Mawdsley, Savage, & Kim, 2015; Li & Carey, 2014),
including forms of ‘‘trilateral” cooperation (McEwan &
Mawdsley, 2012). This includes the transfer of Brazil and
China’s own experiences in agricultural development—and
associated narratives, expertise, and technologies—to Africa1as part of development cooperation investments. The papers
cover new forms of technology transfer, the growth of techni-
cal training eﬀorts, the importance of state–business partner-
ships in investments, the role of small-scale investments by
Chinese migrants to Africa in agricultural value chains, and
the role of Brazilian and international civil society in mediat-
ing debate about the form and pattern of investment.
Together the papers show that there certainly are important
changes afoot: recasting relationships, institutions, politics,
and power in development engagements. Understanding the
new roles of China and Brazil in the context of their own
domestic political economies, and wider global trends in
geopolitical restructuring and the shifting of the geographies
of international capital, allows us to situate these develop-
ments in an historical perspective, and understand how China
and Brazil are positioning themselves as key actors in African
agriculture. Whether this adds up to a new paradigm is per-
haps more questionable. Instead, despite important and signif-
icant shifts in styles of development cooperation, we also see
many echoes of the past, set in a new geopolitical moment,
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in the African context.
This Special Section has seven papers. In the following sec-
tions we introduce some of the key themes highlighted by indi-
vidual papers and across the set. The papers emerge from a
project involving 25 researchers from China, Brazil, Ethiopia,
Ghana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and the UK. 1 The team
represents a diverse array of disciplinary expertise, from agro-
nomists to anthropologists to economists to international rela-
tions specialists to political scientists, all interested in diﬀerent
facets of development, bringing diﬀerent literatures, academic
cultures, and ﬁeld experiences to the project. We have not tried
to constrain this diversity. While all of us have oﬀered insights
and perspectives, with the aim of provoking exchange and
conversation, we have not followed a singular approach,
deﬁned by a uniﬁed theoretical stance. Instead, we have
encouraged deep empirical exploration of complex and fast-
changing dynamics, with the aim of going behind the fac¸ade
of standard approaches. The result is an eclectic mix of styles
and approaches, but one we hope that adds up, as a rich tapes-
try, to a fuller understanding.
Since 2011 detailed ﬁeld investigations of 16 cases of
Chinese and Brazilian engagements have been carried out,
involving extended ﬁeldwork. Over 20 Working Papers and
other articles have been published to date, and the papers in
this issue draw from these, oﬀering a more synthetic view of
emergent patterns and trends. The African cases were chosen
from a country-level mapping of what was happening where,
based on secondary data, triangulated with interviews from
oﬃcials. The cases were chosen to represent a range of styles
of engagement—including conventional ‘‘aid” projects (mostly
around technology transfer), private (or more often state–
business hybrid) investments, training and capacity building
eﬀorts, investments in agri-food systems by migrants and civil
society engagements protesting about investments and aid
projects. Each case, while not representative in any statistical
sense, as all were very diﬀerent, oﬀered a diﬀerent angle on
understanding the dynamics of engagement in agriculture by
Brazil and China.2. CONTEXTS FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
COOPERATION IN AFRICA
‘‘South–South cooperation”, and the extension of Chinese
and Brazilian engagements in African agriculture, therefore
emerges from a particular set of contexts. This includes the
growth of new hubs of capital in China and Brazil, supported
by global ﬁnance, that are entering a globalized competitive
world; a recent, although now declining, commodities boom
and massive growth in demand for resources; a huge growth
in capital goods exports to Africa, especially from China;
shifts in political contexts in China and Brazil seeing new foci
on business and development and new emphases in interna-
tional positioning; an extended period of neoliberal economic
restructuring in Africa that provides space for private (or
state–business) investment; African government and donor
policies that oﬀer support and subsidy for the extension of
capital, and an elite, sometimes corrupt, politics in Africa that
may see new investment as a route to shore up existing com-
mercial and political interests. As Amanor and Chichava
(2016) explain, all these factors play into the dynamics of
development cooperation in Africa.
This reconﬁguration is often read as a period ‘‘beyond aid”,
where development occurs through private investment, with
less of a role for conventional aid agencies. Today private cap-ital and global ﬁnance, from multiple sources, are driving
forces in a globalized, ﬁnancialized, liberalized world. In
diﬀerent ways, Brazil’s and China’s ‘‘development coopera-
tion” eﬀorts, just as those of the US or European countries,
must be seen in this light; as an extension of capital and mar-
kets, now with new roles for the state, as part of state-directed
‘‘developmentalism” (Lee, 2014), and in relation to new pat-
terns of accumulation by capital in new sites across the world
(Moyo, Yeros, & Jha, 2012). As Gu et al. (2016) and Xiuli
et al. (2016) highlight, the new, hybrid relationships between
states and businesses, where state funding supports and guides
and businesses implement, are of particular interest, as they
reveal the emerging ways that expertise, technology, and
ﬁnance are deployed in agricultural development through ‘‘de-
velopment cooperation”.
There is therefore important change, but also continuity. We
are seeing new relationships being forged that are opening up
possibilities for negotiation in African contexts, as new
‘‘donors”, ‘‘investors”, and hybrids between the two, arrive.
This oﬀers greater ‘‘agency” for African governments
(Brown, 2012; Mohan & Lampert, 2013; Mohan & Power,
2008; Tan-Mullins, Mohan, & Power, 2010), and a new room
for manoeuvre (Kragelund, 2008), that was not possible in
previous decades, when the singular strictures of the Interna-
tional Finance Institutions, and the aid conditionalities of
other Western donors, meant that only one option was on
the menu. Today there is greater diversity and choice, and
so negotiation is the order of the day. This presents a new
landscape for development cooperation, deﬁned to encompass
more than just conventional aid transfers and involving an
array of state-supported business relationships and invest-
ments. While China and Brazil remain small players relative
to others, they are gaining inﬂuence, and certainly in the case
of China, the scope and amount of both development assis-
tance and wider investment is growing signiﬁcantly. This
includes a focus on agriculture (Buckley, 2013), a sector that
is especially important for Brazil (Cabral, Shankland,
Favareto, & Costa Vaz, 2013).
Agriculture has been identiﬁed by both China and Brazil as
a strategic focus for engagement with Africa (Cheru & Modi,
2013). This derives from diﬀerent motivations and incentives.
Agriculture is seen as an area where both countries have com-
parative advantage. Both can point to agricultural ‘‘success
stories” in recent decades. Both have experience in tropical
and sub-tropical agriculture, involving similar crops to those
found in Africa, and so can oﬀer technical expertise and tech-
nologies. Agriculture has a diﬀerent strategic value in the
political economy of China and Brazil, with China increas-
ingly relying on food and feed imports to satisfy growing
demand, while Brazil’s economy is heavily dependent on a
strong agribusiness sector, reliant on export commodity sales
(Mueller & Mueller, 2014). While expansion into Africa is very
unlikely to feed China (Brautigam, 2015), there is interest in
contract farming arrangements for key crops (including cotton
and tobacco), and possibilities of investment along agricul-
tural value chains, including for processing, machinery, and
input supply, in forms that may favor poorer producers and
business enterprises, as the technologies are sometimes more
appropriate and the market standards less restrictive than
investments from the West (Kaplinsky, 2013).
For Africa, with its signiﬁcant rural population, large land
areas and challenges of food security, agriculture remains a
top priority, as aﬃrmed in frequent statements from the Afri-
can Union, presidents, and oﬃcials from across the continent.
As a core productive sector, largely ignored by Western
donors for decades, it is an area where external intervention
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Scoones, Devereux, & Haddad, 2005). With preferential trade
deals, supported by the European Union and the United
States, combined with the relative proximity of particularly
European markets, developing export agriculture in Africa
has commercial appeals for foreign investors too. Yet in prac-
tice, as the papers show, there are far fewer land-based invest-
ments on the ground than media reports might suggest
(Brautigam & Ekman, 2012; Brautigam & Tang, 2009;
Bra¨utigam & Zhang, 2013), as lack of infrastructure, distance
to markets, tenure insecurity, and other challenges dissuade
investors.
A major focus of our case study work was to get behind the
often simplistic and unsubstantiated mainstream narratives
about Brazilian and Chinese investment, and develop insights
into the ‘‘encounters” that occur between Africans, Brazilians,
and Chinese in these diﬀerent settings (Scoones, Cabral, &
Tugendhat, 2013). The aim has been to try and understand
the processes of translation, brokerage, and negotiation that
go on as part of ‘‘interface encounters” in these highly varied
aid and investment projects across our cases (cf. Lewis &
Mosse, 2006; Long & Long, 1992; Mosse, 2011). This more
ethnographic and local lens was complemented by research
on the domestic political economies in China and Brazil,
and the actors, networks, and narratives that framed interven-
tions in Africa. By understanding how agriculture, land, and
food issues are dealt with domestically, both currently and his-
torically, and how this is embedded in particular sets of exper-
tise, institutions, and politics, this allowed us to see the case
studies in a diﬀerent light. For what goes on in Africa has trav-
eled from particular contexts, entwined in ‘‘social imaginaries”
(Taylor, 2004) and ‘‘narratives” of agriculture and develop-
ment (Keeley & Scoones, 2003; Roe, 1991). These may get
contested and renegotiated when they land, but they have
much power and inﬂuence, structuring the way development
cooperation is understood and practiced. Of course there is
a ﬂow back too; so experiences in Africa may have inﬂuences
in Brazil and China. For example, as Gu et al. (2016), experi-
ence on tobacco growing in Zimbabwe by Chinese companies
is helping their operations in Yunnan through the involvement
of Zimbabwean experts. Equally, as Shankland and Gonc¸alves
(2016) show for the debate about Brazilian investments in
Mozambique, civil society protests against ProSAVANA in
Mozambique are linking back to policy debates in Brazil
about the focus of cooperation and investment eﬀorts, as well
as domestic policy on family farming. It is this two-way ﬂow
of knowledge, ideas, ideologies, practices, technologies and
people that, in diﬀerent ways, each of the papers focus on.3. AFRICAN CONTEXTS
Engagements with Africa by China and Brazil are not new,
and notions of ‘‘South-South cooperation” have long histo-
ries. As Amanor and Chichava (2016) discuss, the current rise
of economic engagements, and associated political rhetoric,
have to be situated in an appreciation of this history. In the
1960s and 70s China for example supported liberation strug-
gles and newly independent African nations, as part of a com-
mitment to socialist development in Africa. Certain strong ties
were established with political parties, and individuals, some
of whom remain in power. State-to-state relations were fos-
tered in support of the China’s position over Taiwan and its
intensive lobbying for recognition on the UN Security Council
(Amanor and Chichava, 2016). But these were also comple-
mented by party-to-party interactions, often in earlier periodswith groups ﬁghting liberation wars, whether in Ethiopia or
Zimbabwe. Brazil also has historical diplomatic and business
connections with Africa (Da´vila, 2010) and particularly strong
links with Lusophone African countries. But development
cooperation relations are more recent, projected in particular
by the ‘‘presidential diplomacy” under former president, Lula
da Silva (Cabral et al., 2016). A strong diplomatic push to
assert geopolitical inﬂuence was central, and aid and invest-
ment was seen as part of this. As with China, this extended
beyond bilateral relationships, toward a wider inﬂuence on
Brazil’s role in multilateral institutions, whether the World
Trade Organisation (WTO) or the UN Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO), both now with Brazilian heads, which
required African support.
In Africa, the emergence of the ‘‘rising powers”, such as
China and Brazil, has coincided with the rebounding of most
economies in Africa following a long period of economic stag-
nation, caused by a persistent debt crisis, lack of investment,
depressed commodity prices, conﬂict, and the consequences
of structural adjustment. The major restructuring of African
economies through the ‘‘liberalisation” period, often linked
to strict conditionalities imposed by the International Finance
Institutions, has opened up business opportunities for interna-
tional capital, while restricting the role of the state and often
undermining local businesses. But each country in our studies
had diﬀerent experiences of nation-building, structural reform,
and economic adjustment, suggesting the need to go beyond
glib generalizations of either ‘‘Africa rising” or African
decline.
Thus in Ghana, a sustained program of economic liberaliza-
tion has opened up opportunities for agribusiness, with state
and often donor/NGO backing. This has resulted in substan-
tial in-ﬂows of capital from a range of sources, including
China and Brazil but also western countries, as well as an
opening up of business opportunities along value chains with
the relaxing of regulations (Amanor, 2012). Combining
recently with the discovery of oil reserves, and successful elec-
toral transitions, the Ghanaian economy is seen as a relatively
safe place to invest, although declines in the value of the local
currency suggest persisting uncertainties. Yet challenges
remain, especially in the land and agriculture sector. Despite
claims that there is ‘‘idle land” ready for investment, negotiat-
ing access is complex, due to a decentralized land tenure and
administration system, mostly in the hands of chiefs and local
traditional authorities (Boamah, 2014; Schoneveld & German,
2014).
In diﬀerent ways both Ethiopia and Mozambique have also
declared that they are ‘‘open for business”. Following years of
conﬂict, and with deep structural poverty and food insecurity
plaguing both countries, aggregate economic indicators both
show dramatic upward trajectories. But their strategies con-
trast in important ways, which is revealing for how negotia-
tions with Brazil and China unfold. Ethiopia, since the
installment of the EPRDF government in 1991 has taken a
strong ‘‘developmental state” stance, as articulated by the late
prime minister, Meles Zenawi (Vaughan, 2011). 2 Depending
on how it was projected, this could please western govern-
ments, with its call for investment and private business, but
also drew heavily on Chinese thinking about the role of the
state—derived in large part from long associations dating back
to the inﬂuence of Maoist teaching in the Tigrayan People’s
Liberation Front. This has been reinforced, as Tugendhat
and Alemu (2016) discuss, by intensive training and study tour
engagements with China at all levels of the bureaucracy and
party that have occurred since. Thus, the Ethiopian state has
a clear developmental project, and in its latest Growth and
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tructure, as well as agriculture, and seeks support for this from
particular sources. In Ethiopia China is heavily involved in the
development of roads, dams, and other infrastructure, while
Brazil was initially invited to be involved in the development
of the sugar industry to support an ethanol-based biofuels
program (Alemu & Scoones, 2013).
This strategic, developmental focus is less evident in
Mozambique, where investments have been more ad hoc.
However, the high-proﬁle, but largely as yet unrealized, invest-
ment along the Nacala corridor, and the associated ProSA-
VANA project, has been a major focus for the Mozambican
government; although facing an array of resistance locally
and internationally, as Shankland and Gonc¸alves explain in
their paper. Mozambican elite politics, where investments
can support narrow forms of accumulation, have very often
dominated, as discussed for the Chinese ‘‘friendship farm” irri-
gation scheme at Xai Xai (Chichava & Fingermann, 2015;
Zhang, Li, Qi, & Wang, 2015), and more broadly in Mozam-
bique (Alden & Chichava, 2014; Chichava et al., 2013).
Whether this will result in new forms of developmentalism
(neo-patrimonal or otherwise, cf. Kelsall, 2013) or fuel corrupt
patronage politics will depend on local negotiations (Hanlon
& Mosse, 2010).
Zimbabwe presents a contrasting case. Following the land
reform in 2000, the ﬂight of western capital and the with-
drawal of support by international donors, created a vacuum
into which others could move, capitalizing on agrarian
restructuring (Moyo, 2011; Moyo & Chambati, 2013). In the
2000s the Zimbabwean economy was in a state of freefall,
but those with a longer view could see the potentials. The Zim-
babwean state was desperate for investment, and its ‘‘Look
East” policy made connections with China (Youde, 2007);
again building on much older friendships and political links
dating to before Independence (Sachikonye, 2008). While Chi-
na’s support to the ailing economy and isolated regime has
been inconsistent and fragmentary, and far lower than had
been hoped for by President Mugabe and his associates, it
has been important both practically and symbolically, partic-
ularly in Zimbabwe’s on-going confrontation with the West
(Alao, 2014). 3 Following land reform, business opportunities
in tobacco, opened up by the massive expansion of small-
holder farming, resulted in the Chinese state-owned company,
Tianze, becoming the dominant player in tobacco contracting
in the country (Mukwereza, 2015; also Gu et al., 2016).
Each country setting is thus very diﬀerent, and our cases
reﬂect these particularities. Overall, we can see the expansion
of capital and investment in all countries, with states and elites
being closely involved. But we cannot understand what hap-
pens in Africa without reference to the contexts in Brazil
and China, as well as wider changes at a global level. Demand
for commodities—whether food, fuel, feed, timber, or miner-
als—had been growing over the 1990s and into the 2000s,
pushed by demand from China in particular (Lu, Li, & Fu,
2015). Increasingly globalized ﬁnance was supporting this,
through a complex web of instruments linked to multinational
companies, with connections to multiple countries (Fairbairn,
2014). Globalized, ﬁnancialized capitalism in the neoliberal
era had taken on a diﬀerent form, with massive reach and
power (Harvey, 2007).
The 2007–08 ﬁnancial crisis projected a greater need to ﬁnd
sources of investment for footloose capital, and land and agri-
culture as an emergent ‘‘asset class” became increasingly
attractive (Ouma, 2014). The ‘‘global land rush”, focused espe-
cially in Africa, intensiﬁed, and with this, investments from a
range of companies, often closely linked to governments,occurred (Hall, Scoones, & Tsikata, 2015). While there was
much hype about the ‘‘land grab”, and plenty of highly mis-
leading reports and statistics bandied about (Scoones, Hall,
Borras, White, & Wolford, 2013), it was a moment when there
was a concentration of interest in agricultural investment in
Africa, and both China and Brazil (along with many other
investors) were heavily involved (Cotula, 2013).
For African governments, and particularly elites, this was
seen as a great opportunity—ﬁnally to attract investment in
areas that had languished for decades, as well as seek out
opportunities for private accumulation through a range of
joint initiatives and deals. The heat has gone out of the land
rush, as commodity prices have declined, and the diﬃculty
of establishing large land concessions in remote parts of Africa
have been realized, but this period was important for galvaniz-
ing a process of engagement, and for the establishment of new
ventures, that have morphed dramatically since their original
inception (Hall et al., 2015).4. SHAPING DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION:
CHINESE AND BRAZILIAN DRIVERS
China and Brazil have their own economic and political
pressures, as well as state, business, and technological capaci-
ties. These in turn frame and drive these engagements in
Africa. For China, the high level of resource demand to fuel
the growing economy has been a central economic and politi-
cal concern for the past decade or more. This is perhaps espe-
cially so for the case of food. The oft-repeated statistic that
China feeds 20% of the world’s population on 7% of its land
has come under strain, as demand increases and food tastes
shift. Chinese rhetoric has shifted to a focus on ‘‘global food
security”, and the need to support Africa to generate surpluses
that China can in turn import to ‘‘ﬁll the rice bowl” (Li et al.,
2012; Ye, 2015). China’s internal policy focus emphasizes both
agricultural modernization and productivity increases, espe-
cially in large, mechanized farms, while also protecting the
peasant sector to ensure rural stability. Chinese narratives
about agriculture therefore often combine these, emphasizing
the extraordinary success of peasant agriculture, especially
under the Household Responsibility System (Li et al., 2012;
Ye, 2015), while projecting a future of modern,
technologically-advanced, mechanized agriculture, using the
best of Chinese science (Tang, 2013). Since 1999 China has
articulated a ‘‘going out” policy, whereby the extension of
Chinese business enterprises and the sharing of technologies
is encouraged across the world, including Africa (Gu et al.,
2016).
High-level China–Africa engagements have proﬁled strong
diplomatic and business ties between China and Africa, espe-
cially since the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC) began its triannual meetings in 2000. State visits,
trade missions, and a growing development cooperation pro-
gram, signiﬁcantly run from the Ministry of Commerce
(MOFCOM), all testify to the importance aﬀorded to this
eﬀort. State-owned enterprises (SoEs), including from across
the provinces, have been encouraged to be at the forefront
of ‘‘going out” (Gu, 2009; Gu et al., 2016). Since the reforms,
starting from 1978, a form of state market socialism has been
generated—capitalism with ‘‘Chinese characteristics”—that
involves a strong role for the state in ﬁnancing and managing
such enterprises, but an encouragement to operate as commer-
cial, proﬁt-seeking entities (Bremmer, 2009; Huang, 2008).
There are a variety of ﬁnancing mechanisms, and considerable
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Exim Bank, and now the China–Africa Development Fund
in facilitating new business opportunities, both at home and
abroad (Corkin, 2012; Gu, Chen, & Zhang, 2014).
Yet Chinese companies, whether state-owned or private, are
not all the same. Diﬀerent provinces have embarked on reform
and liberalization provinces in quite distinct ways. Diﬀerent
companies have varying central government and party
involvement, and the form of state–business relationship is
often quite diﬀerent, even among SoEs, as Jing Gu and col-
leagues show in their paper. A variegated capitalism is evident
within China, with diﬀerent levels of state and party control
(Lim, 2014; Zhang & Peck, 2014), and often a highly diﬀeren-
tiated provincial character (Mulvad, 2015). When a ‘‘Chinese”
business or development project is seen in Africa, we have to
ask where it comes from, what its origins are, what links to
business associations it has, whether it is being implemented
individually or collectively, what forms of ﬁnancing it is reliant
on, and what conﬁguration of state and private interests are
involved in its organization and management.
Business-run Chinese Agricultural Technology Demonstra-
tion Centres (ATDCs) have been established across Africa,
as part of a the ﬂagship agricultural development cooperation
program of MOFCOM, but they are all very diﬀerent depend-
ing on these factors (Xiuli et al., 2016). Some project a high-
modernist vision of mechanized agriculture, while others ally
more with a vision of the commercial peasant smallholder. It
all depends on the company that is involved, as each can latch
on to diﬀerent elements of the conﬂicted and sometimes
ambiguous policy narrative about Chinese agricultural devel-
opment domestically.
Chinese policymakers have signaled a shift in economic
policy, aiming to take the heat out of rapid growth and reli-
ance on commodity imports, with a rebalancing toward
boosting technology sectors and addressing environmental
sustainability issues (Angang, 2015). This ‘‘new normal” of
Chinese economic and political strategy may again shift the
emphases of the ‘‘going out” policy, and possibly a down-
grading of the natural resource extraction focus. However,
it is unlikely to temper the need for many Chinese enterprises,
both large and small, to seek new markets. Despite the rheto-
ric, Chinese capitalism is quite accepting of the new, liberal-
ized free market conditions in Africa, as this opens new
opportunities.
Investors are not only large-scale. They are often linked to a
growing ﬂow of Chinese migrants to Africa (Mohan, Lampert,
Mullins, & Chang, 2014), engaging in a number of small-scale
business activities, including in the agri-food sector. Migrants
arrive through a number of routes, often as workers on large-
scale infrastructure or construction projects, but also through
mass movements to set up mining activities, as occurred in
Ghana. A number of such migrants, as is shown for Ethiopia
and Ghana (Cook et al., 2016), set up businesses in agricul-
ture—either small-scale farms, or more often getting involved
in processing or retail, often linked to restaurants and shops
serving the now large Chinese populations in major African
cities.
Chinese involvement in African agriculture therefore reﬂects
China’s own policy narratives and imperatives, and is driven
by a range of factors, often with strong state involvement.
However, currently there is no evidence of massive rush for
land resources by Chinese businesses, as some of the more
lurid ‘‘land grab” scare stories suggested (Brautigam, 2015;
Bra¨utigam & Zhang, 2013), although in the longer-term, the
establishment of platforms for commercial engagement may
result in further demands for land by foreign investors (Hallet al., 2015; White, Borras, Hall, Scoones, & Wolford, 2012).
Equally, there is no one form of Chinese engagement in agri-
culture. This ranges from migrant investors, to state–business
led demonstration centers, to private or state-owned business
investments—of varying scales and with often very diﬀerent
motivations, foci, and characteristics. The papers that follow
highlight a range of these, drawing out the contrasts and com-
monalities.
Although on a smaller scale, there is a similar diversity in
Brazilian engagement. This again reﬂects Brazilian domestic
political contests and accommodations. This is especially
apparent in the tensions between a framing focused on
agribusiness and one focused on ‘‘family farming”
(Favareto, 2016). Agribusiness narratives are often centered
in particular on the celebration of Brazil’s success in agricul-
tural modernization; and especially the Prodecer and Proal-
cool experiences from the 1970s that projected Brazil into an
agricultural powerhouse, especially in commercial soybean
and sugar growing. 4 As the core of the growth trajectory of
Brazil’s economy over several decades, the economic impor-
tance and political power of the agribusiness sector should
not be underestimated. This has been promoted internation-
ally as Brazil’s potential contribution to Africa—waking
‘‘the sleeping giant” in the Guinea savannah (Morris,
Binswanger-Mkhize, & Byerlee, 2009), propelling Africa’s
commercial agriculture to new heights (Collier, 2008).
Yet, this is not the only narrative of agriculture associated
with Brazil. As Favareto (2016) shows there are at least three
diﬀerent constructions of family farming in Brazilian domestic
political debate, each associated with diﬀerent narratives and
interests. These impinge on Brazil’s international engagements
in diﬀerent ways. These include a productivist narrative linked
to the cooperative movement, with strong links to some
agribusiness interests. This emphasizes the potentials of family
farming to increase productivity through technology and cap-
italization, and for a transformation to a more business-
oriented style of agriculture. This is contrasted with a narra-
tive around family farming that highlights a more territorial
perspective, linking production to environmental and social
goals, including labor rights. This has support among trade
unions, various NGOs, and environmental groups, and has
echoes in European perspectives on ‘‘terroirs”, as well as more
radical indigenous movements elsewhere in Latin America,
around the notion of ‘‘Buen Vivir”. 5 This is in turn diﬀerent
to the more anti-capitalist agroecology and food sovereignty
stance on ‘‘family farming” promoted by the Landless Work-
ers’ Movement (MST), in alliance with the global food sover-
eignty movement, La Via Campesina. All these versions of
family farming resonate in Brazilian domestic political debate,
and so have diﬀerent inﬂuences on Brazil’s interventions in
Africa (Cabral, 2015; Cabral et al., 2013).
As Cabral et al. (2016) explore in respect of Brazil’s ‘‘More
Food International” (MFI) program in Ghana, Mozambique,
and Zimbabwe, these conﬂicting visions result in tensions in
how Brazilian policy is projected. MFI, while promoting a
position around ‘‘family farming”, for example, has a central
element that is ﬁrmly in the productivist camp, with its Africa
program promoting Brazilian technology (mostly tractors, but
also irrigation equipment and other farm machinery), as part
of an export credit deal with Brazilian manufacturers. This sits
in tension with a wider, more political outreach involving
Brazilian bureaucrats with strong links to social movements
(Pierri, 2013). This emphasizes a more localist perspective,
with more radical links to agrarian reform. Led by the Min-
istry of Agrarian Development (MDA), the MFI program is
seen as pushing a diﬀerent vision of agriculture and develop-
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ture, Livestock, and Food Supply (MAPA), supported by var-
ious agribusiness coalitions. In Mozambique, these interests
collide in the highly controversial program, ProSAVANA,
where agribusiness investments, supported through the Nacala
Fund sit alongside plans for the development of smallholder
farming along the Nacala corridor. As Shankland and Gon-
c¸alves describe, the contrasting Brazilian ‘‘imaginaries” of
agricultural development are exported to Africa under the
ProSAVANA, but are also challenged by networks of acti-
vists, linking farmer unions in Mozambique with social move-
ments in Brazil.
Brazil’s world-renowned agricultural research institute,
Embrapa, is heavily involved in Brazil’s work in Africa. There
is often a claim that, given similar agroecological conditions,
Brazil can oﬀer useful technical advice and help transfer tech-
nologies. This occurs through the Agricultural Innovation
Marketplace, 6 via Embrapa consultants advising a number
of programs and businesses, and through its oﬃce established
in Ghana in 2006. Embrapa’s history is ﬁrmly associated with
Brazil’s success in agribusiness expansion, and so the organi-
zation is often seen to be closely linked to agribusiness con-
cerns. However its scientiﬁc portfolio is much larger than
this, and also includes programs associated with agroecology
and small-scale farming. As with China’s technology transfer
programs, and the role of the ATDCs, it all depends on the
context within which the diﬀerent technologies are promoted.
As Xiuli et al. (2016) emphasize, technology transfer is not just
a linear process, but one embedded in a wider politics, and
highly dependent on the performative space within which tech-
nologies are shared. In both Brazilian and Chinese develop-
ment cooperation, these spaces vary widely across a range of
diﬀerent projects and programs.
As with China, the political context for Brazilian coopera-
tion is fast-changing. The presidential diplomacy of Lula, that
emphasized political and economic solidarity with Africa,
shared experiences through slavery, and a commitment to
‘‘South-South” cooperation for development, has shifted as
conditions in Brazil have changed. President Dilma Rousseﬀ
has not engaged in the multiple trips to Africa like her prede-
cessor. She has other concerns at home, notably a sluggish
economy, a growing political crisis linked to corruption scan-
dals, and opposition to the Workers’ Party rule by the urban
middle classes. Combined with a contraction of the economy
with the disappearance of the commodity boom of the late
2000s, this means that the current government is looking less
to its inﬂuence abroad, and more to domestic political and
economic concerns. 7 A number of the much-hyped Brazilian
investments in Africa have not materialized, including ProSA-
VANA, which remains at the planning stage in Mozambique
(Cabral, 2015; Shankland and Gonc¸alves, 2016). Equally,
despite multiple visits and much bilateral discussion, it was
India which took on the support for the expansion of ethanol
in Ethiopia. Brazilian business had hoped that Africa would
be a platform for export expansion, and would gain preferen-
tial trade, tax, and start-up ﬁnance deals. Africa was seen as a
route to the European market for example, and a staging post
for further exports to Asia. But Africa, with some exceptions,
has proven to be a tough place to extend business ventures in
agriculture. Expected funding for agricultural projects from
Brazil’s development banks, notably the BNDES, now with
an oﬃce in Johannesburg, 8 has been slow to materialize. In
addition, red tape, local politics, harsh environments, poor
infrastructure plague new capital from China and Brazil, just
as they have old capital. That said, there is still a signiﬁcant
expansion of Brazilian companies in mining and infrastruc-tural development; and for many such investments are seen
as an important precursor to future investments in land and
agriculture. While the land rush may have stalled, this may
only be temporary.
The expansion of Brazil’s investments in Africa is also
aﬀected by engagements with civil society. This again has
changed over time. A decade or more ago, the Landless Work-
ers’ Movement (MST) was in the ascendancy and had a large
inﬂuence over the MDA, and the associated aid and invest-
ment programs. Many former social movement activists,
including from the unions, became bureaucrats within a
Workers Party-led government, and so not surprisingly had
an inﬂuence on the framing of policies. Today, the MST pro-
jects its role more in alliance with international movements,
notably La Via Campesina, and together they have been
important in presenting an opposition to ProSAVANA in
Mozambique, together with local farmers’ groups and NGOs.
This internationalized discourse of opposition to the assumed
depredations of Brazilian capital is discussed by Shankland
and Gonc¸alves in their paper. It throws up many contradic-
tions, both in Mozambique, where a localist, agroecological
vision is not universally shared, and in Brazil, where the
MST/La Via Campesina version of ‘‘family farming” is not
necessarily the dominant one, as social movements, coopera-
tives, unions, and farmer groups have sought a more prag-
matic version that combines productivism with social and
environmental goals, in their domestic struggles (Favareto,
2016).
Just as state and business visions of agriculture and develop-
ment are exported, so too are civil society visions. Brazil’s
agricultural policy—with its two ministries and two diﬀerent
sectors, characterized as agribusiness and ‘‘family farm
ing”—represents a form of ‘‘dualism”. But, as discussed by
Cabral et al. (2016), it is more complex than this, reﬂecting
more than just two narratives and associated interests. As they
show, this complexity is reﬂected in Brazilian engagements in
Africa—but also the export of these tensions and conﬂicts to
Africa, resulting in multiple discussions, negotiations, and
sometimes misinterpretations. These debates are in turn reim-
ported back to Brazil, enriching and elaborating discussions
on what is meant by ‘‘family farming” (of course very diﬀerent
in the African context) and what role agribusiness should take
in agricultural development.5. A NEW POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT
COOPERATION?
What then do the papers tell us about whether there are new
modes of engagement emerging, and whether this amounts to
a new style and politics of development cooperation? A num-
ber of themes are suggested.
First, commerce and business are central. Aid and public
development ﬁnance—including through development
banks—often provides support, but the underlying driver is
the expansion of business interests, linked to geopolitical
ambitions. These range from high-proﬁle, prestige projects like
the trilateral Brazil–Japan–Mozambique ProSAVANA pro-
ject or the ‘‘friendship farms” and ATDCs from China to
much smaller, less obvious, but cumulatively perhaps as
signiﬁcant, investments from migrants and small businesses
in diﬀerent parts of agri-food systems. Unlike in some OECD
countries (although less so in recent years), where aid and
trade are separated, the expansion of business interests is seen
as central to the development cooperation project of both
Brazil and China, alongside the extension of political and
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involve commitments to contribute to developmental goals,
as with the companies running the Chinese ATDCs, which
are expected to engage in training and demonstration activi-
ties, but whose contribution must be sustained through pursu-
ing market-based activities. Equally, business investment,
often with loss-leading arrangements supported by the state,
may be geared to wider objectives, such as improving food
security or boosting productivity in agriculture. The result is
that business and development objectives become blurred;
sometimes being mutually supportive, sometimes being in con-
ﬂict. Brazil’s MFI, for example, emerged at the conﬂuence of
trade and family farming political advocacy; an alliance, that
in Mozambique at least, became increasingly diﬃcult to sus-
tain in the face of civil society criticism (Cabral, 2015).
As new hubs of capital globally, with growing economies
and a demand for resources to import or markets to export
to, it is no surprise that foreign policy and diplomatic over-
tures in Africa are linked to business interests. Training and
capacity building eﬀorts must be seen in this light, as discussed
by Tugendhat and Alemu (2016). Building networks, soliciting
political and commercial alliances, and training technicians
and bureaucrats are all part and parcel of creating new plat-
forms for capital expansion. While overt ‘‘land grabs” have
not by-and-large been part of this, the expansion of business
interests in mining, construction, and infrastructure develop-
ment has very often preceded investments in agribusiness.
For this reason, seeing agribusiness in its wider context, as
farming, but also wider value chains including technology,
inputs, and processing, is critical. Linked patterns of invest-
ment in certain areas—particularly along ‘‘corridors” or in
‘‘investment zones” allows often highly diversiﬁed companies
to link infrastructure, logistics, mining, and agribusiness
(Paul & Steinbrecher, 2013; Weng et al., 2013). This should
be no surprise, but sometimes the rhetoric of ‘‘South–South
cooperation”, ‘‘mutuality”, and ‘‘solidarity” diverts attention
from the subtle and extensive operations of capital (Amanor
and Chichava, 2016). For African politicians and business
elites, a new source of investment oﬀers new opportunities,
and is widely welcomed, but as discussed in the conclusion,
there are inevitably winners and losers.
In this respect, the emergence of China and Brazil as players
in African agriculture follows a pattern of business expansion
and capital accumulation seen many times before, emerging
from older powers and older centers of capital. This is how-
ever diﬀerent to earlier periods of capitalist expansion under
colonialism, for example. It is too simplistic to argue that this
is a repeat of imperial conquest and colonialism, but with new
players (Bond & Garcia, 2015). In many instances the sources
of ﬁnance are global, and the structure of companies and alli-
ances are linked in ways that defy any direct association with
nation states (Amanor, 2013). Yet, for both Brazil and China,
the presence and directive role of the state is very evident. This
is a second strong theme that emerges across the papers. The
expansion of Brazilian and Chinese business interests, and
with them an array of diﬀerent ‘‘development cooperation”
projects is very much in the mold of ‘‘state capitalism”—with
Brazilian and Chinese characteristics. Thus the way state and
business alliances are forged at home structures the way these
are exported to Africa.
In important ways, this is diﬀerent to how states tend to
invest in and inﬂuence overseas business investment and aid
projects in OECD countries. Here a long period of neoliberal
policy means that business, often in large transnational corpo-
rate forms, operates independently, seeking ﬁnance on private
markets, and without state involvement. Of course the originsof such business may be rooted in state support, and in the
areas of agricultural technology highly dependent on state-
supported research. The US and European agricultural
biotechnology industries, for example, while notionally ‘‘pri-
vate” today, have many public investments, especially through
publicly-funded agricultural universities, that have supported
their development over time.
Brazil and China embrace a ‘‘developmental” or ‘‘en-
trepreneurial” state model, with a strong, directive role for
the state, in both innovation and subsequent support and
steering (Chang, 2003; Mazzucato, 2013), an approach
increasingly being adopted by Western donors too
(Mawdsley, 2015). This takes many forms, as already dis-
cussed, but includes the important role for state development
banks (BNDES and CDB respectively), a role for State-
Owned Enterprises (particularly for China), and a strong focus
of the aid eﬀort on supporting and facilitating business
(through, for example, the importation of tractors through
MFI or the promotion of technologies through the ATDCs).
As Gu et al. (2016) show, state–business alliances linked to
China’s African investments are hugely varied, reﬂecting the
varieties of arrangements at home across diﬀerent provinces
and diﬀerent business structures. The same applies to Brazil.
A central feature of much cooperation between Brazil and
China and Africa is technology transfer. As already discussed,
there is a frequent narrative that, because of their recent expe-
riences of development, their technological capacity and the
similar agroecological conditions, they have much to oﬀer.
Chinese and Brazilian ‘‘models”—based on iconic and often
rather simplistically characterized experiences, whether the
Cerrado ‘‘model” from Brazil or the intensive smallholder
farms from China—are extensively promoted. A third theme
that runs through the papers is the limits of this ‘‘technology
transfer” paradigm, and the problem of policy ‘‘models”. 9
This has been an important lesson from Western development
eﬀorts in Africa and elsewhere over many decades (Chambers,
Pacey, & Thrupp, 1989; Scoones & Thompson, 2009), but one
that has not always been heeded. Technologies (or wider pol-
icy models) do not get elaborated in a vacuum. These are
always embedded in social, economic, cultural, and political
contexts (Sumberg & Thompson, 2012). If these contexts are
not comparable, it is no surprise that the transfer of technolo-
gies or policies often fails. The cases of success—such as power
tillers from China—are where there is a clear demand; a low
cost, allowing wider ownership; the technology ﬁts within a
broader value chain; and imported technologies come with
wider support for repairs and servicing (Agyei-Holmes,
2013). There is no doubting the excellence of Brazilian and
Chinese science and technology capacity, residing in Embrapa
or the Chinese Academies for example, but this may not have
purchase in very diﬀerent settings. Too often, technologies and
policy models come wrapped up in wider visions of what agri-
culture and development should look like, and are not
matched to local contexts.
As we have seen these visions—constructed as social imagi-
naries and promoted as policy narratives—are very often con-
tested at home, so these contests only expand as they land in
Africa. This is a fourth theme that cuts across the papers.
Whether experts, consultants, trainers, policymakers, business
people, or civil society activists, there are diverse views as to
what is appropriate, both in Brazil and China, let alone Africa.
Along with the technologies, narratives of development, imag-
inaries of particular places, and contests over development
solutions are exported as part of the development encounter;
and with these a long history and often intense domestic pol-
itics. These have important connotations for how development
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translated, and implemented.
Thus, for example, Brazilian ‘‘family farming” has, as we
have discussed, multiple, contested versions—and none of
these are in any way similar to the conditions found in Africa.
Subsidized tractors may well work for an emergent family
farmer in southern Brazil, but certainly not on a two hectare
farm in Africa, unless local institutional arrangements exist
for their management and hiring across multiple farms. The
same applies to Chinese technologies, and policy promotion.
As Tugendhat and Alemu show, Chinese training courses pro-
mote a whole array of technologies and policy models—from
hybrid rice growing methods to rural poverty alleviation pre-
scriptions—but not many of these are taken up by their Afri-
can course participants. Instead, the interventions—be they
the transfer of farm equipment or the training of technicians
and oﬃcials—serve very often more as a performative remin-
der of the importance of the link, and a symbolic aﬃrmation
of the idea of development aid as ‘‘gift” (Eyben, 2009;
Mawdsley, 2012b) and the exertion of ‘‘soft power”, and so
carry greater weight and signiﬁcance than their notional con-
crete aims. Much Brazilian and Chinese development cooper-
ation is about the long game of forging networks and building
relations, ones that can be made use of later, and that serve to
establish China or Brazil as a player, competing with other
donors, businesses, NGOs, and activist groups from western
countries.
Another theme that recurs through the papers is a perspec-
tive on development cooperation and investment as a process:
a series of negotiated encounters, which carry with them a
range of meanings and implications. Our insights from partic-
ular projects in particular places pushes us to move beyond the
structural analysis of political interests and geopolitics to a
more textured, nuanced understanding of projects and invest-
ments in practice. Here the interactions between external
experts and investors with local bureaucrats, technicians,
and farmers become central. These can be understood as
‘‘knowledge encounters”, where diﬀerent visions, worldviews,
cultural perspectives, as well as technologies, agronomic routi-
nes, and management practices are negotiated (Fechter, 2012;
Lewis & Mosse, 2006; Long & Long, 1992).
As Xiuli et al. (2016) explain for the Chinese ATDCs, these
can be fraught, sometimes resulting in misunderstandings and
confusion. Combined with the pressures of the job—in this
instance seeking a self-funding model within 3 years–the pres-
sures on expatriate experts, who very often do not speak any
locally-used language and are away from home for long peri-
ods—can be intense. Accommodations, friendships, and new
relations have to be struck. Technology and policy transfer
is also a very human process, mediated by a range of factors.
As Cabral et al. (2016) show for Brazil, the deep commitment
and political solidarity found among many Brazilian experts
combines with a lack of understanding and failure to engage
with local realities. These features are of course not new to
Chinese or Brazilian cooperation (c.f. Lewis & Mosse, 2006),
but it means that new cultural and political dimensions are
introduced, and must be negotiated as part of development
encounters.
For African counterparts this can be both enriching and
confusing. Many African agricultural bureaucrats have had
long exposures to Western aid programs, as well as investors,
dating from the colonial era to the present. Very often edu-
cated in the West, they know the language, the routines, and
the expectations. The often ritualized dance that is played
out in the very uneven ‘‘partnership” between donor and ben-
eﬁciary has been repeated many times over. While trainingprograms and other forms of exposure are increasing, as doc-
umented for China by Tugendhat and Alemu (2016), Brazilian
and Chinese development eﬀorts are still relatively new. For
senior policymakers trying to balance diﬀerent donors oﬀ
against each other, and seeking a range of investments in a sec-
tor, having some new players is widely welcomed. This allows
more room for maneuvre, as the ‘‘aid coordination” of the last
decade or so, and the standardized forms of conditionality
that were attached had limited options.
The new players open this up, and their ability to chal-
lenge—sometimes inadvertently—some of the patterns in aid
and development is refreshing. They also provide support
for areas that Western donors have long ignored, such as
the productive sectors, including agriculture, along with
investment in core infrastructure, as many Western donors
have prioritized the social sectors, and broader policy inter-
ventions around ‘‘human rights” and ‘‘good governance”.
These interventions were often seen as unwelcome meddling
by African states, and the absence of productive sector
investments has been a concern, especially in the context of
post-adjustment economies that had been hit hard by the with-
drawal of state support. Basic training of state oﬃcials, includ-
ing technicians, is widely welcomed too, given the limited level
of support for this by Western donors (Tugendhat and Alemu,
2016). Thus China and Brazil are seen to ﬁll a gap, and in a
way that allows a new conversation with development agencies
and investors to take place, allowing African states—although
in highly diﬀerent political-economic settings—to be more
assertive in their negotiations and more selective in what they
choose to take up.6. CONCLUSION
We started our research by asking if there is a new paradigm
of development cooperation emerging, with the ‘‘rising pow-
ers”, including Brazil and China, leading the way? Did the
positive rhetoric of South–South cooperation and mutual sol-
idarity suggest that old dependencies and impositions in devel-
opment were about to be thrown aside? Were there new ways
of doing things emerging that all could learn from? The
answers are somewhat equivocal. As the papers show, there
are important new elements of Brazilian and Chinese cooper-
ation in agricultural development in Africa, and with this a
new politics for sure, but there are also many continuities from
older experiences; and actually the achievements on the
ground have often been more modest and troubled than the
early hype suggested.
The emergence of new players in development cooperation
is certainly welcome. It allows greater space for negotiation
by African governments as they secure investments, loans,
and aid projects. It expands the array of expertise and sources
of technology that are available. It opens up new opportunities
for exchange and learning from particular historical experi-
ences of agricultural development. It encourages a more
multi-dimensional set of interactions in development coopera-
tion, where old donors, emerging powers, and African states
are having to seek new, perhaps more equal, accommodations,
and are beginning to learn lessons from each other. And it
allows development to engage with the new geopolitics, where
ﬁnance, power, and control does not reside only in ‘‘Western”
countries and institutions.
With this, new logics for development cooperation are
emerging. These go beyond the neoliberal frame of the Wash-
ington Consensus, where states were not supposed to engage
and markets ruled. Instead a more ‘‘developmental state”
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characteristics, ones that Western donors are observing with
great interest. Here states are seen as active participants in
development processes: framing, facilitating, and steering
development very actively. Strong state–business alliances
are central to this, and have emerged as a core part of devel-
opment strategy, in agriculture as in other areas. The particu-
lar (and diverse) experiences of both Brazil and China are
crucial here, as Africa seeks to move beyond the debilitating
period of economic reform and adjustment to a new develop-
mental era.
This complex mix of aid, investment, trade, and diplomacy
that characterizes the new politics of development cooperation
creates a new dynamic in agriculture in Africa. The productive
sectors such as agriculture have long been starved of support
from Western donors. The focus of expertise has narrowed,
and business investments have been limited. While there has
been a recent galvanization of interest in agribusiness invest-
ment through the G8’s New Alliance for Food Security and
Nutrition Initiative, this has largely focused on large-scale
business investment, and not on wider agricultural develop-
ment eﬀorts. The Chinese and Brazilian interventions
discussed in the papers show a huge array of engagements—
from large-scale ‘‘friendship farms”, to supporting contract
farming, to technology demonstration, to training experts, to
supporting smallholder farming.
There is clearly no one Brazilian or Chinese ‘‘model”, as
development interventions emerge from often quite contested
narratives around agriculture and development, linked to very
diﬀerent and variegated political settings. Rather than a single
model, there are diverse experiments, and many development
eﬀorts in Africa are adapting through experimentation and
adaptive learning; often through major challenge and diﬃ-
culty, and sometimes failure. There are important lessons
learned about state–business relations, about technology
transfer, about the limits of large-scale farm investments,
about supporting value chains, about technical training and
demonstration in African contexts, and so on. Outside the
few formal trilateral cooperation arrangements, very often
Brazilian and Chinese initiatives remain piecemeal and iso-
lated, and both African governments and Western aid donors
fail to learn from them. This is a shame given the growth of
investment and the opportunities for re-galvanizing African
agricultural development after a long period of neglect.
But this should not be a search for a singular ‘‘model”, as is
sometimes suggested. These ‘‘models”—whether Brazil’s
agribusiness Cerrado experience or successful family farms
or China’s peasant farming revolution or high-tech modern-
ized agriculture—are all constructions, located in particular
historical, social, and political contexts. They emerge, as the
papers describe, from competing narratives in domestic polit-
ical and policy debates, which often travel to Africa. When
such ‘‘models”, rooted in particular social imaginaries and
visions of agriculture, land on the ground, they confront diﬀer-
ent social, ecological, and political realities, and frequently
unravel. Negotiations on the ground oﬀer potentials for
reframing, recasting, and redeﬁning these narratives for local
contexts. The role of civil society engagement is critical. Wesee this in the case of Brazilian development cooperation very
visibly, and this allows for contestation of constructed,
exported ‘‘models”, and the presentation of alternatives. In
China we see debates happening in diﬀerent forms, but con-
trasts between approaches taken by diﬀerent provincial com-
panies across the ATDCs, for example, oﬀer a diversity of
approaches.
We argue that these knowledge encounters over develop-
ment visions and pathways are essential. Some elements may
indeed be relevant, others not. Experimentation, adaptation,
revision, and continuous learning has long been part of, for
example, Chinese policy processes (Husain, 2015), and so
needs to be central to this current experience. These are
long-term engagements, expected to unfold over decades, so
early learning—and we are only at the start of this unfolding
process now—is crucial. This of course contrasts rather starkly
with the normal routines of Western aid agencies, with short
project cycles, narrow deliverables, and strict monitoring
and evaluation criteria. A more ﬂexible, long-term, experimen-
tal form of development cooperation however may yet emerge
from the Chinese and Brazilian experience.
A new politics and practice of development cooperation
inevitably creates winners and losers. On the positive side,
Africa has long waited for investment in agriculture and asso-
ciated productive sectors. New, stable, state-to-state relation-
ships that stand outside the Bretton Woods institutions’
dictates allows for greater room for maneuvre for both Africa
states and external investors. However, as various papers
show, such arrangements can undermine a more inclusive or
environmentally-sustainable approach, and are sometimes
subject to elite capture, as certain investments are selectively
appropriated as part of local accumulation strategies. As
already discussed, new forms of Brazilian and Chinese devel-
opment cooperation must also be seen in relation to the emer-
gence of both countries as new hubs of capital, seeking
opportunities for accumulation. Diﬀerent drivers are relevant,
with Brazil’s economy centrally reliant on agribusiness
exports, while China must balance the dual challenges of
assuring national food security, while promoting business
abroad. Just as the West’s post-colonial development experi-
ence must be seen in relation to particular dynamics of both
global and domestic political economies—whether post-
colonial settlements in certain regions, Cold War contests
between the West and the Soviet bloc or Western-led expan-
sion of capital in the context of globalization—so too must
contemporary Brazilian and Chinese engagements in Africa.
In sum, we must move beyond the simplistic narratives of
either ‘‘South-South” collaboration or ‘‘neo-imperial” expan-
sion to look at the real politics of engagement. This aﬀects
how interventions are framed, and by whom. It inﬂuences
what technologies are chosen, which investments are funded,
and who gets trained. Clearly there are both political and eco-
nomic drivers at the heart of these choices, but these are not
uniform or uncontested. The papers in this issue oﬀer an
insight into the early negotiations around a range of themes
in African agricultural development; but the engagements of
both Brazil and China in African agriculture are going to be
part of a much longer story, from which much can be learned.NOTES1. See: http://www.future-agricultures.org/research/cbaa.
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